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 ‘Pushing the boundaries’: 
The limits and limitations of new public management 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper considers the limitations and boundaries of new public management (NPM) through a case 
study on activity within Transpower, a New Zealand state-owned enterprise (SOE).  The case 
highlights complexities of NPM in practice, and reveals inconsistencies between structured theoretical 
principles and less structured reality on the fringes of NPM.  An assessment of NPM reveals blurred 
lines and boundaries within NPM frameworks, with implications for public sector organisations such 
as SOEs, government, and other external stakeholders.  Despite regulations and guidelines, the reality 
of NPM is such that SOE managers may push the boundaries beyond the point where the shareholders 
and public are comfortable.  Thus, a key challenge of NPM involves finding a balance between 
commercial freedom and external stakeholder acceptability.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of New Public Management (NPM) - adopting a commercial and innovative approach 
to business within government organisations - has been both criticised (Terry 1993) and supported 
(Borins 2000).  While those such as Moe (1994) and Moore (1992) suggest that commercial activity is 
outside the scope of government, others have supported a more business-like, and proactive approach 
within a public sector context.  The various rationales for increased commercialism in the public sector  
include increased efficiency with minimal bureaucracy (Moon 1999); a deliberate search for 
innovative change (Linden 1990); cost minimisation (Ramamurti, 1986); generation of new revenue 
sources (Bellone & Goerl 1992); on-going innovation to achieve increased efficiency and 
effectiveness (Osborne & Gaebler 1992); operating with a strong customer focus under competitive 
market forces (Cullen & Cushman 2000); and adopting creative and risk-taking activity (Lewis 1980).  
However, while the potential of NPM has been well promoted, noticeably less attention has focused 
on how far public sector organisations can or should go in pursuing a more commercial approach; the 
boundaries within NPM frameworks. 
There is continued disagreement about various aspects of a commercial approach to NPM.  Some 
researchers (Morris & Kuratko 2002; Terry 1993) contend that the concepts of innovation, risk-taking, 
and proactivity seem inconsistent with public sector organisations which are traditionally viewed as 
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bureaucratic, risk-averse and conservative.  Others (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Ramamurti 1986; 
Weinstock 2002) note the increasing acceptance and growing expectation of efficient, proactive, and 
even innovative activity within the public sector.  Thus, NPM has been upheld as an effective pathway 
to address the increasing expectations placed upon government, as well as to promote economic 
development and growth on a national scale (Osborne & Gaebler 1992).  However, somewhat less 
attention has been given to identifying and understanding where the outer limits (or boundaries) lie 
with respect to roles, responsibilities, and acceptable commercial behaviour in a NPM context.  This 
lack of attention is perhaps because we often learn from experience and the explicitly commercial 
arena for NPM is a relatively new one.  Thus, common understandings and practices are still being 
developed and shaped (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
This paper explores the complexities of NPM in practice, through a case study on activity within 
Transpower New Zealand Limited, one of 16 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating in New 
Zealand.  New Zealand’s reforms with respect to SOEs are recognised as comprehensive in nature, 
successful in increasing service efficiency, and a prime example of NPM (Easton 1999; Eggers 1997; 
Schick 1998).  Polidano (1999) notes New Zealand’s reforms are a clear example of NPM, involving a 
systematic approach.  Khaleghian and Das Gupta (2005: 1084) refer to New Zealand as a ‘poster 
country’ for NPM with sweeping reforms being adopted in the mid 1980s involving corporatisation 
and market deregulation. With the reforms now well-embedded and commercial activity being both 
encouraged and implemented, New Zealand’s SOE sector provides a valuable context in which to 
explore some of the boundaries within NPM, the focus of this paper. 
In recent times, the New Zealand Government has encouraged SOEs to broaden the scope of their 
operations (Mallard 2006); an invitation for expanding SOEs’ business operations, with an expectation 
of increased profits.  Such freedoms, however, raise the question of: Where do the boundaries of 
commercial activity lie with respect to NPM in practice?  Transpower, a SOE operating within the 
framework of New Zealand’s SOE reforms, provides an interesting case study for a number of 
reasons.  First, the organisation operates in a deregulated market, yet effectively functions as a 
monopoly.  It is monitored by various government organisations, and subject to similar expectations as 
those placed on other SOEs, yet also faces a number of unique regulatory challenges and restrictions.  
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And last, Transpower took a rather controversial approach to financing part of its operations, entering 
into two transactions in particular which resulted in significant controversy and public scrutiny.  
Transpower’s activities were referred to as ‘pushing the boundaries’ by Transpower (Roberts personal 
communication, July 6 2006), approved as ‘legal and tax positive’ by the New Zealand Government 
(CCMAU 2005), and largely viewed as irresponsible and unacceptable by the general public 
(Alexander 2005).  The following sections of this paper present a review of selected literature on 
NPM, followed by an overview of New Zealand’s public sector reforms.  Details of the research 
method and case study findings are then presented, followed by a brief discussion of three key issues, 
and a conclusion.        
A REVIEW OF NPM 
The emergence of NPM in the late 1970s has been a key issue on the reform agenda of various 
OECD countries (Hood 1991; Parker & Gould 1999).  The theoretical foundations of NPM have been 
traced to new institutional economics and managerialism, promoting professional management and 
freedom to manage as central to improved organisational performance (Martin 2003).  While Hood 
(1991) notes NPM as a concept may not be an all-encompassing solution, with inevitable sources of 
conflict (e.g. government intervention resulting in imperfect market competition), he also 
acknowledges its potential, subject to the inclusion of a number of important features (e.g. separation 
of management and state).  Schick (1998) highlights the importance of established political and 
economic governance frameworks as essential foundations for NPM in practice.  Sinclair (1995) and 
Day and Klein (1987) consider various accountability dimensions relevant to the public sector, but 
note formal lines of accountability are often blurred by public views and expectations on what 
constitutes good conduct and acceptable performance.  However, few commentators have specifically 
addressed the outer limits of what is acceptable within the scope of NPM in practice. 
Given the relative newness of NPM and the ongoing development of such reforms in various 
countries – something O’Flynn (2007: 358) refers to as ‘two decades of experimentation’ – perhaps 
the success and specifics of NPM remain a question for the future (Mulgan 1997).  Arguably, 
however, an examination of issues arising from SOE reforms such as those in New Zealand which 
have been implemented and refined over the past two decades, can provide valuable insight into 
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understanding the complexities and challenges of NPM in practice.  Specifically, this paper provides 
the opportunity to consider not only the liberties of NPM, but also the limitations (or shortcomings) 
and boundaries. 
Notwithstanding NPM’s relatively recent implementation, researchers such as Stoker (2006) and 
O’Flynn (2007: 353) have started to look beyond NPM’s framework and limitations, towards new and 
alternative paradigms such as public value – ‘a way of thinking which is both post-bureaucratic and 
post-competitive’.  Essentially, however, it is the principles of NPM which remain at the fore of 
various countries’ political agendas (O’Flynn 2007; Shirley 1999).  While various approaches to NPM 
have been taken, a policy initiative which gained significant attention in the 1980s was the 
corporatisation of SOEs.  In particular, New Zealand’s SOE reforms have attracted significant 
attention from foreign governments (Cullen 2003) due to their perceived success.  The following 
section presents a brief overview of New Zealand’s SOE reforms. 
NEW ZEALAND’S PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS 
New Zealand underwent major public sector reform beginning in the 1980s, with the intention of 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness within the public sector (Mulgan 1997).  The new approach 
focused on emphasising results and outcomes, together with effective use of public sector resources.  
As part of these reforms, government departments with a strong trading function were corporatised 
and/or privatised.  The underlying concept was that such services could be more efficiently provided 
by commercially-orientated organisations, rather than remaining subject to ministerial control and 
government interference.  Specifically, New Zealand’s SOE reforms involved market deregulation, 
with express profit-making requirements imposed on SOEs, resulting in accountability for both 
competitive services and commercial results.  Other features of the reforms included self-funding 
obligations, separation of SOE management and the state, the role of Government redefined as 
purchaser of outputs rather than provider of inputs, together with performance-based contracts and 
rewards for managers (Brash 1996).  Thus, corporatisation provided the opportunity and the incentive 
for these former government departments to become both efficient and profitable, enabling freedom of 
commercial choice and responsibility for generating commercial returns.   
Given the nature and role of certain SOEs, however, monopolistic positions were sometimes 
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difficult to avoid.  Essentially they arose from default rather than design, due to the practicality of one 
organisation fulfilling the required role within their respective industries in a nation the size of New 
Zealand.  Consistent with market deregulation and competition, SOEs were subject to industry 
regulations, and tendered for contracts under commercial terms.  In 2004, for example, Transpower, as 
owner-operator of New Zealand’s national electricity grid, was contracted for a five year period to be 
the systems operator for the New Zealand wholesale electricity market.  After that period, the contract 
would be once again available for tender.  
METHOD 
This case study is based on triangulated data (Yin 2003) including publicly available texts (from 
within and outside Transpower) and in-depth personal interviews, providing the foundations for 
examination from the outside and inquiry from the inside (Evered & Louis 1981).  Examination from 
the outside involved review of documentation relating to the conduct of New Zealand’s SOE sector 
and Transpower in particular, including legislation, ministerial announcements, press releases, and 
media reports, as well as Transpower’s annual reports from 2002 to 2006.  These documents provided 
background detail on the operating environment of Transpower and SOEs in general, together with 
financial outcomes and implications of SOE activity.  Inquiry from the inside involved two interviews 
with Chris Roberts, (then) Communications Manager of Transpower1.  The interviews were conducted 
in person at Transpower’s offices in Wellington, New Zealand, over a two year period (July 2006 and 
July 2007).  Interviews were semi-structured, ranging from 1-1.5 hours, with discussion shaped by a 
comprehensive schedule of questions relating to Transpower’s past and current activities.  
Specifically, questions focused on the operating context and regulatory environment of SOEs in 
general, and Transpower in particular, as well as commercial, strategic, and entrepreneurial activity 
undertaken recently or currently by the SOE.  
Conducting interviews in two phases over a two year period provided a valuable longitudinal 
perspective (Villalonga 2000), allowing insight into the development of events and changing 
perceptions over time, particularly as New Zealand approached an election year (2008).  Interviews 
                                                     
1 Interviews were also conducted with senior executives from 11 other SOEs, as part of a broader study, to 
compare activity across the SOE sector. 
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were recorded, transcribed, and returned to the interviewee for confirmation and approval, prior to 
analysis.  Coding of more than 40 pages of transcripts was then undertaken in two phases: manually, 
and later with the use of NVivo.  Data categorisation and thematic analysis was an iterative process 
which resulted in a number of themes emerging, as detailed in Table 1.  Analysis of transcripts, and 
comparison with publicly available secondary data revealed a number of interesting findings relevant 
to NPM in practice, and Transpower in particular.  A case study on the activities within Transpower 
was then constructed, drawing upon the challenges and anomalies of NPM with respect to 
Transpower, to explore differences between structured theoretical principles and a more complex, rich 
and vivid (Miller & Friesen 1978), yet unstructured reality (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner 
2007).  The case study is presented next.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
TRANSPOWER 
Transpower was established as a SOE in 1994, and assumed the role of owner and operator of 
New Zealand’s national electricity transmission grid. ‘The national grid’ comprised over 12,000 
kilometres of high voltage transmission lines connecting power stations owned by generating 
companies to more than 170 electricity substations feeding local networks that distributed electricity to 
commercial and residential consumers.  The electricity grid served three core functions: transportation 
of energy throughout New Zealand, facilitation of competition between energy generation providers, 
and the provision of a secure, safe, and reliable energy supply (Transpower 2006).  Specifically, 
Transpower’s main operating objective was to ‘keep New Zealand’s electricity flowing and support a 
sustainable energy future’ (Transpower 2007: 1).  However, the company faced a number of 
challenges in meeting this objective.  Old and failing equipment requiring ongoing maintenance and 
significant upgrade, presented operational and financial challenges for Transpower.  Unreliable power 
supply and repeated threats of power cuts caused considerable frustration for the business community 
and general public (see Figure 1 below).  Strained relations between Transpower and various 
stakeholders (including farmers, landowners, the general public, Government and opposition parties, 
environmentalist lobby groups), arose due to Transpower’s proposed upgrade of the national 
transmission grid, and the company’s perceived attitude of arrogance (New Zealand Herald 2006a).  
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And the regulatory environment in which Transpower operated was referred to as ‘dysfunctional’, due 
to numerous regulatory authorities, some with overlapping roles.  This latter issue is explored further 
in the following section. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Operating in the shadow of regulatory authorities 
As a SOE, Transpower operated within a framework designed to be free from government 
intervention and political influence in its day-to-day operations.  As owner-operator of New Zealand’s 
national electricity grid, however, Transpower was regulated by a number of government authorities 
including the New Zealand Electricity Commission (established to approve transmission investments 
and the allocation of transmission service costs between users of the national grid), and the Commerce 
Commission (established to ensure compliance with the New Zealand Commerce and Fair Trading 
Acts, overseeing a wide range of industries).  With respect to the electricity industry, the Commerce 
Commission regulated the quantum of Transpower’s revenues to ensure excessive monopoly-like 
profits were avoided (Transpower 2005).  In 2004, the Commerce Commission imposed regulations to 
restrict Transpower’s revenue generation.  Specifically, a revenue threshold based on the Consumer 
Price Index less one per cent was applied to Transpower’s services (Transpower 2005).  Transpower 
viewed the threshold as inappropriate, given the level of activity and investment required in the 
national grid, and was subsequently subject to a formal inquiry under the Commerce Act for breaching 
the threshold in 2004 and 2005.  Transpower, however, expected these breaches would continue 
(Transpower 2005; Roberts personal communication, July 6 2006).   
In 2005, Transpower expressed ‘serious concerns on the direction being taken’ (Transpower 2005: 
4) within the industry.  Of particular concern was the overlap in the scope of the two regulatory 
authorities’ roles with respect to Transpower’s revenue, pricing, and services.  This overlap was 
publicly acknowledged by various stakeholders as ineffective and problematic.  John Sexton of the 
Federated Farmers Association, referred to the industry as ‘dysfunctional’ (Rural News 2006).  
National Party Energy spokesman Nick Smith noted ‘the reality for Transpower in the past two years 
is that both the Commerce Commission and the Electricity Commission have been blocking its 
attempts to invest and upgrade the grid’ (Scoop 2006: 5).  Transpower also publicly aired its 
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frustration.  ‘Effective regulation is needed to ensure that necessary new investment can be undertaken 
in a timely manner.  Unfortunately that is not what appears to be developing in New Zealand.  The 
Electricity Commission’s approach to regulating transmission investment risks undermining 
Transpower’s accountability for the performance of the national grid’ (Transpower 2005: 6).   
The consultation process was described as ‘often confrontational and always challenging, working 
to find a balance between infrastructure requirements and the private property rights and interests of 
communities’ (Transpower 2005: 4).  However, while Transpower was forced to operate under the 
shadow of regulatory authorities, several stakeholders suggested Transpower’s attitude of ‘no 
alternative to stringing 430 huge power pylons across the Waikato and South Auckland landscape’ 
(New Zealand Herald 2006a: 2) may have contributed to its problems.   
Transpower’s strategy, operations, and financing activities 
Transpower’s strategy was one of growth, as it prepared to invest in upgrading the existing 
infrastructure and securing electricity supply to meet growing demands for power in New Zealand; 
developing a national grid plan for the next 40 years.  The initial investment was expected to take 
more than 10 years and involved expenditure of more than $1.5 billion (Gorman 2004).  Subsequent 
projects were expected to cost in the range of $100 million per annum, over a 10 year period.  The full 
scope of Transpower’s plans extended to 2040.  The 400kV line was referred to as ‘a major 
infrastructure project in every sense of the word’ (Transpower 2005).  Approvals were required from 
industry regulators, local councils, and individual landowners affected by the proposed project.  ‘There 
are real risks for New Zealand in the long-term if we fail to promote a regulatory regime which is 
recognisable and acceptable to international capital markets’ (Transpower 2005: 6). 
The Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit (CCMAU), set up to monitor the performance of 
Government organisations, referred to Transpower’s performance as ‘steady’ in recent years (2005: 
79).  Table 2 presents a summary of Transpower’s performance over the five year period from 2002 to 
2006 detailing profits in the range of $23.2 million to $144.5 million, and dividends in the range of 
$16.5 million to $82.9 million.  Forecast dividend payments for 2007 to 2008 were negotiated down to 
$10 million per annum, to allow for large-scale investment in the grid (Transpower 2005).   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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While Transpower had established profitable operations, strong financial results in 2005 proved 
costly in terms of the company’s reputation.  The significant increase in profits during 2005 was 
attributable to an increase in the demand for electricity, as well as one-off gains from two rather 
controversial transactions.  In 2003 Transpower entered into two separate arrangements referred to as 
‘cross-border lease and structured finance transactions’ (CCMAU 2005: 79).  While CCMAU (2005: 
80) seemed satisfied the transactions were ‘legal in the relevant jurisdictions and tax positive for New 
Zealand’, the New Zealand public was less accepting. 
In 2003, Transpower essentially entered into a ‘lease-in lease-out’ arrangement involving overseas 
banks and a syndicate of United States investors with entities in the Cayman Islands.  The circular 
lease transactions, involving Transpower’s $700 million high-voltage transmission grid located in 
New Zealand’s South Island, gave rise to tax benefits for the US investors.  As consideration for those 
benefits, Transpower received a one-off payment of $34.6 million (Roberts personal communication, 
July 6 2006).  The second arrangement involved a loan of $700 million taken out by Transpower, $500 
million of which was on-lent to other companies.  The arrangement effectively provided Transpower 
with a lower interest rate on the $200 million funding it required.  The arrangements were subject to 
significant criticism within New Zealand, regarding the legitimacy and ethics of the first transaction, 
and the unnecessary assumption of risk with respect to the latter transaction (Alexander 2005; Gorman 
2005).  Transpower’s view was that it managed the associated risk, and resourcefully accessed cost-
effective finance.  ‘What the taxpayers fail to see is that (receipt from the first arrangement) was $34.6 
million (the public) didn’t have to pay for electricity’ (Roberts personal communication, July 6 2006).  
However, speaking in what they saw as the public interest, others took a different view. 
It’s about whether Transpower was behaving appropriately with crucial assets.  Should 
overseas companies ‘own’ such assets?  Transpower seems to have ignored its social 
responsibility.  The other issue is transparency.  We should know what is happening with our 
assets.  What did the Government know about this?  Has the South Island electricity grid been 
sold or leased?  Transpower will not confirm details, but this kind of lease is usually up to 99 
years.  The assets are considered ‘sold’ under United States tax law, because the deal runs for 
longer than the useful life of the assets.  Transpower’s position was that at no time had it lost 
legal ownership of the assets.  It also said commercial confidentiality had limited its ability to 
answer questions (Gorman in Alexander 2005, ¶8).  
 
While the legality of the transaction was confirmed at the time, such deals were subsequently 
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made illegal in the United States (Alexander 2005).  Questions were raised in the New Zealand media. 
‘Strictly legal or not, is it ethical?  Why would you put major assets at risk for $34 million?’ 
(Newberry in Gorman 2005: 28).    
Regarding the [loan arrangement], why is Transpower acting like a bank?  That’s not its job 
at all.  There is a $100 million default payment if the loan conditions aren’t met – where 
would Transpower get $100 million if [other parties to the loan] default? (Gorman in 
Alexander 2005: 9)   
 
There is also the question of who should front up on such crucial issues when the going gets 
tough.  Transpower has failed in this regard.  The grid company says its chairman, David 
Gascoigne, never talks to the media; its chief executive, Dr Ralph Craven, leaves it to his 
public relations staff to weather the storm.  As happened when Transpower admitted last 
winter that there could be power cuts in [the South Island] because its lines did not have 
enough capacity, Craven has again proved to be more elusive in a crisis than a torch in a 
blackout (The Press 2005: 4). 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
While the above case study provides a brief overview of Transpower’s operations2, and in particular 
its financing activities, a number of more fundamental and complex issues emerge with respect to 
NPM in practice.  Although the case broaches issues such as the various roles of government in the 
context of NPM, and the difficulty in isolating government’s responsibilities in terms of SOEs’ 
political and managerial accountability, three central issues emerge.  The first issue concerns the 
liberties and limits of NPM in practice, such that commercial freedom is balanced with the interests 
and expectations of shareholders and the general public.  The second involves the variation, and at 
times tension, between legal requirements and ethical expectations placed upon SOEs, particularly 
when operating with the freedom afforded under commercial principles of NPM.  And the third issue 
relates to the onus on government to establish a regulatory framework which allows SOEs to operate 
effectively (i.e. with the freedom of commercial choice intended). Each issue is discussed below.  
 Given the nature of SOEs, it is not surprising that Transpower operates in a critical sector where 
there is strong government, commercial, and political interest.  Meeting the expectations of these 
stakeholders, however, and balancing the interests of each becomes increasingly complex.  This is 
particularly so where Transpower faces added restrictions which (to some extent) diminish the SOE’s 
accountability.  Thus, within a framework intended to promote freedom of commercial choice, what 
                                                     
2 For a more comprehensive overview of Transpower’s operations, see Luke, Kearins, & Verreynne (2008). 
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boundaries, if any, should apply to the choices made?  While Transpower did not violate laws and 
entered into transactions which were clearly commercial in nature, such activity raises the question as 
to what liberties should be afforded to SOEs under NPM frameworks.  The SOE Act 1986, for 
example, identifies SOEs’ objectives as being profitable and efficient, good employers, and  
organisations which exhibit a sense of social responsibility.  However the lack of detail, varying 
interpretations, and at times conflicting interests, ultimately lead to variations of NPM in practice.  
These issues, which are perhaps part of what Hood (1991) refers to as inevitable sources of conflict. 
Nevertheless, the lack of defined boundaries reflects an important limitation within NPM frameworks.  
Accordingly, the limits – or boundary conditions (Dubin, 1978) of the theoretical framework of NPM 
require attention. 
 Regarding the legal requirements versus ethical expectations, findings from the case raise the issue 
as to who should be ultimately accountable for ensuring the choices are appropriate, given the interests 
of various stakeholders?  Interestingly, both Transpower and the Government viewed the SOE’s 
financing transactions as acceptable, and it was only as New Zealand approached an election year that 
the Government advised similar transactions should not be entered into (Roberts personal 
communication, July 10 2007).  Further, while the legality of the transactions was confirmed, there 
seemed to be no such concern (other than perhaps public) that the SOE was assisting in an 
arrangement which ultimately resulted in a loss of tax revenue for the United States Government.  
Thus, the issue arises as to whether an agreed ethical code (an issue relevant to both the public and 
private sector) should be part of NPM frameworks, particularly given SOEs’ social function.  The 
blurred lines of accountability referred to by Sinclair (1995), and emphasis on accountability for 
financial performance and results (with respect to both SOEs and government) indicates another 
limitation of NPM.  Arguably, this emphasis requires further consideration, such that a balance 
between commercial performance and social and ethical leadership is achieved.  Given NPM 
represents an emerging field with a wide range of stakeholders, potentially its success hinges on 
reaching shared agreement on what is (and isn’t) acceptable practice, such that NPM evolves to reflect 
the expectations of a wider audience (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004).   
 Another issue which emerges from the case is the responsibility of Government to establish a 
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workable regulatory framework in which SOEs must operate.  While Transpower’s financing activities 
were clearly unwelcome in the public domain, restrictions placed on Transpower’s revenue streams 
raise the issue of Government’s accountability to ensure an effective regulatory environment, which in 
turn ensures Transpower can be held fully accountable for its own actions.  While the boundaries of 
NPM are not clear from the literature, activities such as those arising in practice (e.g. Transpower’s 
approach to financing) are perhaps a timely reminder for the scope of NPM to be expressly considered 
or reviewed.  The lack of detail surrounding this issue within NPM in practice reflects both a 
limitation of current theory and practice, and is perhaps an extension of the issues raised by Schick 
(1998).  While Schick highlights the importance of stable and developed political and economic 
governance frameworks from a national perspective, the operating environment of Transpower 
highlights the importance of a proactive and responsible government overseeing and contributing to 
effective regulatory frameworks from an industry perspective.  
CONCLUSION 
This case shows some of the fundamental problems within the domain of a SOE have not been 
overcome by structural and managerial reform.  Further, the case highlights the complexities of NPM, 
contrasting structured theoretical principles with less structured (and sometimes irregular) practice.  
Issues which emerge from the case may be viewed as a call for a re-think of NPM, borrowing perhaps 
from principles central to ethics, accountability,  and institutional theory, such that the implied is made 
more express, and the expectations of all stakeholders more explicit, as the relatively new domain of 
NPM evolves.  In particular, findings from this case (and future research focusing on the anomalies of 
NPM in practice) may be used as a foundation for addressing some of the limitations of NPM and a 
more deliberate consideration of where the boundaries for NPM might lie.  Specifically, defining clear 
boundaries, establishing limits on what is acceptable practice, and reviewing the emphasis on 
accountability for financial performance are areas (and limitations) to be addressed within NPM 
frameworks.   The tendency for SOE managers to push the boundaries with perhaps unfortunate results 
(from a financial or social perspective) could result in NPM’s demise if due attention is not given to 
the limits and limitations of NPM in practice.   
13 
REFERENCES 
Alexander M (2005 19 June) Who has the power? Sunday Star Times, accessed at http://io.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/poly/cma/cma/pl?id=21418 on 12 July 2006. 
Balls A (2003 June) Energy crisis...what energy crisis? NZ Business, pp. 46-47, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma.pl?id=18391 on 14 July 
2006. 
Bellone C & Goerl G (1992) Reconciling public entrepreneurship and democracy, Public 
Administration Review, 52(2): 130-134 
Borins S (2000) Loose canons and rule breakers, or enterprising leaders? Some evidence about 
innovative public managers, Public Administration Review, 60(6): 498-507. 
Brash D (1996 4 June) New Zealand's remarkable reforms, accessed at 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/speeches/0031201.html on 18 January 2006. 
Cosgriff D (1998 16 November) Power cuts disrupt city retailers, The Southland Times, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge- 
basket.co.nz.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma.pl?id=18589 on 14 July 2006. 
Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit (2005) Briefing to Incoming Ministers: September 2005. 
Cullen M (2003 11 December) Cullen at induction seminar for SOE directors, accessed at 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/cullen+induction+seminar+soe+directors on 17 January 
2008. 
Cullen R & Cushman D (2000) Transitions to competitive government: Speed, consensus, and 
performance, State University of New York, Albany. 
Day P & Klein R (1987) Accountabilities: Five public services, Tavistock, London. 
DiMaggio PJ & Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields American Sociology Review, 48(2): 147-160. 
Dubin R (1978) Theory building, Free Press, New York. 
Easton B (1999 30 January) Tales of SOEs, accessed at 
  http://www.eastonbh.ac.nz/article613.html on 8 February 2005 
Eggers W (1997 1 March) The wonder down under, accessed at  
http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articledid=15462 on 18 January 2006. 
Eisenhardt KM (1989) Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 
14(4): 532-550. 
Eisenhardt KM & Graebner ME (2007) Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges 
Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 25-32. 
Evered R & Louis M (1981) Alternative perspectives in the organisational sciences: "Inquiry from the 
inside" and "inquiry from the outside", Academy of Management Review, 6: 385-395. 
Gerbich, C (1998 9 June) City plunged into darkness The Evening Standard, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma.pl?id=18589 on 12 July 
2007. 
Gorman P (2004 10 April) Making way for grid revamp, The Press, accessed at http://io.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/poly/cma/cma.pl?id=21418 on 14 July 2006. 
Gorman P (2005 15 April) Transpower deal puts SI power grid at risk, The Press, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz/poly/cma/cma.pl?id=21418 on 12 July 2006. 
Hood C (1991) A public management for all seasons? Public Administration, 69(1): 3-19. 
Khaleghian P & Das Gupta M (2005) Public Management and essential public health functions, World 
Development, 33(7): 1083-1099. 
Lewis E (1980) Public entrepreneurship: Toward a theory of bureaucratic power, Indiana University, 
Bloomington. 
Linden R (1990) From vision to reality: Strategies of successful innovators in government, LEL 
Enterprises, Charlottesville. 
Luke B, Kearins K & Verreynne M (2008 29 June - 2 July), Who's afraid of the dark? (Case study and 
teaching note on Transpower New Zealand Limited), Paper presented at the World 
Association of Case Method Research and Application, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
Maguire S, Hardy C & Lawrence TB (2004) Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: 
HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. Academy of Management Journal, 47(5): 657-379. 
14 
Martin J (2003) The Public Service in Miller R (Ed) New Zealand Government and Politics (3rd edn) 
pp 132-144, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
Miller D & Friesen PH (1978) Archetypes of strategy formulation, Management Science, 24(9): 921-
933. 
Moe R (1994) The 'reinventing government' exercise: Misinterpreting the problem, misjudging the 
consequences, Public Administration Review, 54(2): 111-123. 
Moon M (1999) The pursuit of managerial entrepreneurship: Does organisation matter? Public 
Administration Review, 59(1): 31-43. 
Moore J (1992) British privatisation - taking capitalism to the people, Harvard Business Review, 
70(1): 115-124. 
Morris M & Kuratko D (2002) Corporate Entrepreneurship, Harcourt College Publishers, Fort Worth. 
Mulgan R (1997) Politics in New Zealand (2nd edn), Auckland University Press, Auckland. 
New Zealand Herald (2006b 11 July) Auckland's blackout could have been avoided, inquiry finds, The 
New Zealand Herald, accessed at 
http://www.newzealandherald.co.nz/section/print.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10390740 on 11 July 
2006. 
New Zealand Herald (2006a 29 April) Well-merited jolt for Transpower, The New Zealand Herald, 
accessed at http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz/poly/cma/cma/pl?id=21418 on 12 July 2006. 
O'Flynn J (2007) From new public management to public value: Paradigmatic change and managerial 
implications, Australian Journal of Public Administration, 66(3): 353-366. 
Oliver P (2006, 28 June) Power-cut threat for two years, The New Zealand Herald, accessed at 
http://www.newzealandherald.co.nz/section/print.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10388720 on 28 June 
2006. 
Osborne D & Gaebler T (1992) Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is 
transforming the public sector, Addison-Wesley, Reading. 
Parker L & Gould G (1999) Changing public sector accountability: Critiquing new directions, 
Accounting Forum, 23(2): 109-135. 
Polidano C (1999) The new public managment in developing countries. Institute for Development 
Policy and Management Working Paper no. 13. accessed at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN014322.pdf on 1 
July 2007. 
Ramamurti R (1986). Public entrepreneurs: Who they are and how they operate, California 
Management Review, 28(3): 142-158. 
Rural News (2006, 4 July 2006) Revised power plan. Rural News, accessed at http://io.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/poly/cma/cma.pl?id=20655 on 12 July 2006. 
Schick A (1998) Why most developing countries should not try New Zealand's reforms, The World 
Bank Research Observer, 13(1): 123-131. 
Scoop (2003 14 July) Govt creams profit from energy crisis, accessed at http://io.knowledge-
basket.co.nz.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma.pl?id=18391 on 14 July 2007. 
Scoop (2006 27 June) Blackout reports raise more questions than answers, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz/poly/poly/cma/cma.pl?id=20655 on 12 July 2006. 
Shirley M (1999) Bureaucrats in business: The roles of privatisation versus corporatisation in state-
owned enterprise reform, World Development, 27(1): 115-136. 
Sinclair A (1995) The chameleon of accountability: Forms and discourses, Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 20(2/3): 219-237. 
Steeman M (2006 19 June) Lack of investment blamed for blackout, The Press, p. 6, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma on 21 June 2006 
Terry L (1993) Why we should abandon the misconceived quest to reconcile public entrepreneurship 
with democracy: A response to Bellone and Goerl's 'Reconciling public entrepreneurship and 
democracy', Public Administration Review, 53(4): 393-395. 
The Press (1998 21 February) Auckland nears state of emergency on power, accessed at 
http://io.knowledge-basket.co.nz.ezyproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma/pl?id=18589-194 on 14 
July 2006. 
The Press (2003 17 April) Power play as energy crisis looms, accessed at http://io.knowledge-
basket.co.nz.ezproxy.aut.ac.nz/magz/cma/cma.pl?id=18391 on 14 July 2006. 
15 
The Press (2005 29 April) Lines of responsibility, The Press, accessed at http://www.knowledge-
basket.co.nz/poly/cma/cma.pl?id=21418-192-106-P%3A&cma=d on 12 July 2007. 
Transpower (2005) Annual Report. 
Transpower (2006) Annual Report. 
Transpower New Zealand Limited (2007) Our purpose and values, accessed at 
http://www.transpower.co.nz/?id=6409 on 3 October 2007. 
Villalonga B (2000) Privatisation and efficiency: Differentiating ownership effects from political, 
organizational, and dynamic effects, Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 42: 43-
74. 
Weinstock M (2002) Building entrepreneurs Government Executive, 34(7): 55-60. 
Yin R (2003) Case study research: Design and methods, Sage, London. 
 
16 
Table 1 Themes and related issues 
Themes Sub-themes  Related issue 
1. freedom of 
commercial choice 
 
• restricted by industry regulators  
• result in multiple lines of accountability (managerial, 
political, public) 
• restrictions on decision-making give rise to accountability 
implications 
• difficulty of balancing multiple  interests of stakeholders 
• ethical issues versus financial issues (implied versus express) 
 
• limitation 
• conflict of interest 
 
• accountability impaired 
 
 
• boundaries and limits unclear, 
issue to be addressed 
 
2. SOE working well 
under the reforms 
 
• SOE reforms generally working as intended 
• difficulty in balancing multiple interests of stakeholders 
• industry reforms restrictive 
 
• limitation 
• limitation 
 
3. accountability and 
responsibility for 
commercial results 
 
• accountability mechanisms clear 
• multiple lines of accountability  
• accountability both to and from government for an effective 
operating environment 
 
 
• limitation 
• dual accountability 
4. freedom from 
political influence 
 
• regulatory environment of industry  
• regulatory environment a function of government  
 
• limitation 
• dual accountability 
5. government support • seasonality of politics, particularly during election years  
 
• limitation 
 
Figure 1 Headlines on New Zealand’s electricity woes 
 
1998 Auckland nears state of emergency on power   (The Press, 1998) 
 City plunged into darkness     (Gerbich, 1998) 
Power cuts disrupt city retailers    (Cosgriff, 1998) 
Energy crisis…what energy crisis?    (Balls, 2003) 
Power plays as energy crisis looms    (The Press, 2003) 
Government creams profits from energy crisis   (Scoop, 2003) 
Making way for grid revamp     (Gorman, 2004) 
Transpower deal puts (South Island) power grid at risk  (Gorman, 2005) 
Well-merited jolt for Transpower    (New Zealand Herald, 2006a) 
Auckland’s blackout could have been avoided, inquiry finds  (New Zealand Herald, 2006b) 
Lack of investment blamed for blackout    (Steeman, 2006) 
Blackout reports raise more questions than answers   (Scoop, 2006) 
2006 Power cut threat for two years     (Oliver, 2006) 
 
 
Table 2 Summary of Transpower’s financial performance 
$m 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average
1 Revenue 545.6        528.9        534.1        636.1        640.2        577.0        
2 Net profit after tax 144.5        23.2          59.2          141.5        96.9          93.1          
3 Total assets 2,281.3     2,242.8     1,745.8     2,743.5     2,888.3     2,380.4     
4 Contributed capital 1,200.0     1,200.0     1,200.0     1,200.0     1,200.0     1,200.0     
5 Equity 1,012.6     1,001.0     1,043.6     1,145.1     1,232.0     1,086.9     
6 Dividends % 57% 150% 28% 28% 10% 55%
7 Dividends paid 82.9          34.9          16.5          40.0          10.0          36.9          
Key
1 Revenue - total revenue for the year
2 Net profit after tax for the year
3 Total assets - based on year end values
4 Contributed capital - total contributed capital based on year end values (representing the amount of capital contributed by the New Zealand Government)
5 Equity - total owners' equity based on year end values
6 Dividends % - dividends paid compared to net profit after tax for the year
7 Dividends paid for the year
